An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems by Takagi, Shohei & Serizawa, Shigehiro
Discussion Paper No. 677 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
IN MATCHING PROBLEMS 
 
 
Shohei Takagi 
and 
Shigehiro Serizawa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2006 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
 
An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems∗
Shohei Takagi1 and Shigehiro Serizawa2
1 Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama,
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, JAPAN(e-mail: fge012ts@mail2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp)
2 Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,6-1, Mihogaoka,
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, JAPAN(e-mail: serizawa@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp)
Summary. This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solu-
tions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually
rational matching rules are manipulable in the one-to-one matching model. We pursue the possi-
bility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of respect
for unanimity. Our first result is positive. We prove that a strategy-proof rule exists that is in-
dividually rational and respects unanimity. However, this rule is unreasonable in the sense that
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best for each other should be matched, and an agent wishing to stay single should stay single.
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1. Introduction
We study the possibility of designing strategy-proof rules that yield satisfactory solutions to
matching problems. By matching problems, we refer to the several important allocation prob-
lems in two-sided matching markets where agents, from the start, belong to one of two disjoint
sets: for example, workers and firms, students and colleges, and athletes and teams. Allocations
in these markets are matchings, assigning each agent in one side of the market the agent(s) in
the other side.
A matching rule chooses a matching for each preference profile. A matching rule is efficient
if it always chooses a matching such that no other matching exists that would make all agents
better off. A matching rule is individually rational if an agent is never assigned to a partner to
whom the agent prefers staying single. Individual rationality is necessary for agents to volun-
tarily participate matchings. A matching is blocked by a pair if each agent in the pair prefers the
other in it to the assigned partner. A matching rule is stable if a matching rule is individually
rational, and for any preference profile, the chosen matching is not blocked by any pair. Sta-
bility guarantees the rights of all agents in the sense of not compelling them into unacceptable
matches.
Because the agents’ preferences are not known to others, there may be incentives for agents
to misrepresent their preferences in order to manipulate the final outcome in their favor. As a
result, the chosen matching may not be socially desirable relative to the agents’ true preferences.
Therefore, matching rules need to be immune to such strategic misrepresentation to certainly
choose desirable matchings based on agents’ true preferences. A matching rule is strategy-proof
if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to announce its true preference.
The possibility of matching rules satisfying desirable properties has been explored by many
studies. Gale and Shapley (1962) prove that a stable rule, called the “Gale–Shapley mecha-
nism”, exists. Roth (1982) shows that all stable matching rules containing the Gale–Shapley
mechanism are not strategy-proof. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) pursue the possibility of a
strategy-proof rule by relaxing stability to efficiency and individual rationality, and show the im-
possibility of designing matching rules satisfying efficiency, individually rationality and strategy-
proofness.
In this paper, we pursue the possibility of a strategy-proof matching rule by relaxing ef-
ficiency or employing a substitutive concept. A preference profile is unanimous if, unless an
agent prefers to stay single, the partner the agent most prefers also prefers the agent. A match-
ing rule respects unanimity if for any unanimous preference profile, every agent is matched to
the partner the agent prefers most. Our first result is positive. We prove that there exists a
strategy-proof rule that is individually rational and respects unanimity. However, this rule is
unreasonable in the sense that a pair of agents who are the best for each other are matched on
only rare occasions.
In order to explore the possibility of better matching rules, we introduce a natural condition,
which we call “respect for pairwise unanimity”. A matching rule respects pairwise unanimity
if a pair of agents who are the best for each other should be matched, and an agent wish-
ing to stay single should stay single. Compared with stability, respect for pairwise unanimity
“weakly”guarantees the rights of all agents. Our second result is negative. We prove that there
exists no strategy-proof rule that respects pairwise unanimity. Since stability implies respect
for pairwise unanimity, this result implies Roth’s (1982) negative result.
Section 2 introduces the one-to-one matching model and presents our results. Section 3
1
extends the negative result of the one-to-one matching model to the many-to-one matching
model. Section 4 concludes.
2. One-to-One Matchings
2.1. One-to-one matching model
Here, we consider the one-to-one matching model, known as the marriage problem. Let M =
{m1,m2, . . . ,mn} be the set of men, and W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wl} be the set of women. We assume
that both M and W are finite and disjoint sets. We also assume that n ≥ 2 and l ≥ 2.
Each mi ∈ M has a preference relation P(mi) on W ∪ {mi}. For each man mi ∈ M, the
alternative mi implies that mi stays single. We assume that preferences are strict. For x, x′ ∈
W ∪ {mi}, xP(mi)x′ means that mi prefers x to x′. Each woman w j ∈ W has a similar preference
P(w j) on M ∪ {w j}. Let P(mi) denote the set of all possible preferences for mi, and let P(w j)
denote the set of all possible preferences for w j. We denote preference profiles by P. Let
P = ∏ni=1P(mi) ×∏lj=1P(w j) be the set of all possible preference profiles. Given a profile P,
an agent x ∈ M∪W and a preference P′(x), we denote by P/P′(x) the profile obtained from P by
changing the preferences of x from P(x) to P′(x), and keeping all other preferences unchanged.
For all preferences P(mi) ∈ P(mi), b(P(mi)) denotes the most preferred element in W ∪ {mi}.
Similarly, for all preferences P(w j) ∈ P(w j), b(P(w j)) denotes the most preferred element in
M ∪ {w j}.
A (one-to-one) matching is a function a : M ∪W → M ∪W such that
(1) [a(mi) < W ⇒ a(mi) = mi] and [a(w j) < M ⇒ a(w j) = w j], and
(2) a(mi) = w j ⇔ a(w j) = mi.
Condition (1) requires that individuals who are not matched with agents of the opposite set
must stay single. Condition (2) requires that if a man mi is matched to a woman w j, then this
woman w j should be matched to that man mi.
Let A be the set of all possible matchings.
Definition. A matching a is (Pareto) efficient at preference profile P if there does not exist
another matching a′ , a such that for all x ∈ M ∪W,
a′(x) , a(x)⇒ a′(x)P(x)a(x).
Definition. A matching a is individually rational at profile P if each individual who is matched
prefers her or his partner to staying single; i.e.,
[a(mi) ∈ W ⇒ a(mi)P(mi)mi] for all mi ∈ M, and
[a(w j) ∈ M ⇒ a(w j)P(w j)w j] for all w j ∈ W.
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Definition. A matching a is blocked by a pair (mi,w j) ∈ M × W at profile P if w jP(mi)a(mi)
and miP(w j)a(w j). A matching a is stable at profile P if it is individually rational and it is not
blocked by any pair in M ×W.
A matching rule on P is a function f from P to A.
In this paper, we title the result of the following algorithm1, the M-optimal matching rule:
Step 1. (a) Each man proposes to his most preferred woman.
(b) Each woman rejects the proposal of any man to whom she prefers staying single. Each
woman who receives more than one proposal rejects all but her most preferred. Any man whose
proposal is not rejected at this point is kept engaged.
.
.
.
Step k. (a) Any man who was rejected in the previous step proposes to his most preferred
woman among those who have not yet rejected him, so long as a woman remains to whom he
prefers to staying single and has not yet proposed.
(b) Each woman receiving proposals rejects any from men to whom she prefers staying sin-
gle, and also rejects all but her most preferred among the group consisting of the new proposers,
together with any man she has kept engaged from the previous step.
The algorithm stops after any step where no man is rejected. At this point, every man is
either engaged to a woman or has been rejected by every woman on his list of women he prefers
to staying single. Now each man who is engaged with a woman is matched with her. Each
woman who did not receive any proposals from men she prefers to staying single, and each man
who is rejected by all women he prefers to staying single, will remain single. This completes
the description of the algorithm.
We call the similar algorithm with women proposing, the W-optimal matching rule.
Remark. (Theorem 2.8 in Roth and Sotomayor, 1990): The M-optimal and W-optimal match-
ing rules produce stable matchings for any preference profile.
We consider an incentive compatibility requirement, strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness
says that for every agent, stating the true preferences should be a dominant strategy.
Definition. A matching rule f on P is manipulable by an agent x ∈ M ∪ W at P ∈ P via
P′(x) ∈ P(x) if f (P/P′(x))(x)P(x) f (P)(x). A matching rule f is strategy-proof on P if it is not
manipulable at any profile in P by any agent x ∈ M ∪W via any preference in P(x).
We introduce the minimum condition of efficiency, respect for unanimity.2 Respect for
unanimity states that for any preference profile where unless an agent prefers staying single,
the partner the agent most prefers also prefers the agent, every agent should be matched to their
most preferred agent.
1We borrow the description of the algorithm from Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
2Respect for unanimity is the “minimum” condition of efficiency in the sense that it is a necessary condition
for almost all reasonable conditions of efficiency.
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Definition. A matching rule f respects unanimity on P if for all P ∈ P,
[b(P(b(P(x)))) = x for all x ∈ M ∪W]⇒ [ f (P)(x) = b(P(x)) for all x ∈ M ∪W]
We also introduce a natural axiom, respect for pairwise unanimity. Respect for pairwise
unanimity states that a pair of agents who are the best for each other should be matched, and an
agent for whom staying single is the best should stay single.
Definition. A matching rule f respects pairwise unanimity on P if for all P ∈ P and all
x ∈ M ∪W,
b(P(b(P(x)))) = x⇒ f (P)(x) = b(P(x))
Remark. Respect for pairwise unanimity implies respect for unanimity.
A matching rule f is stable if for all profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is stable at P. A matching rule
f is individually rational if for all profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is individually rational at P. Finally, a
matching rule f is efficient if for all profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is efficient at P.
Remark. Stability implies respect for pairwise unanimity. However, as Example 1 illustrates,
respect for pairwise unanimity does not imply stability.
Example 1. Let n = l = 2. Consider a preference profile P′ ∈ P defined below3:
P′ :
{
P′(m1) = w1w2m1 P′(w1) = m2m1w1
P′(m2) = w1w2m2 P′(w2) = m1m2w2
}
.
Let f be a matching rule that assigns the same matching as the M-optimal rule except for the
preference profile P′ and assigns to P′ the following matching a:4
f (P′) = a :
{
m1 m2 _
_ w1 w2
}
.
It is easy to see that f respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not stable.
Remark. Both efficiency and respect for pairwise unanimity are sufficient conditions for respect
for unanimity. However, as Example 2 illustrates, efficiency and respect for pairwise unanimity
are mathematically independent on P.
Example 2. Let n = l = 2. Consider a preference profile P′ ∈ P defined below:
P′ :
{
P′(m1) = w2w1m1 P′(w1) = m2m1w1
P′(m2) = w2w1m2 P′(w2) = m2m1w2
}
.
Let f1 be such that for all P ∈ P and all y ∈ M ∪W,
(1) if there exists an agent y ∈ M ∪W such that b(P(b(P(y)))) = y, then f1(P)(y) = b(P(y)), and
3An ordered list of mates indicates the agent’s preference from better to worse among the possible mates.
4We use the same notation as Roth and Sotomayor (1990): a pair (mi,w j) on the same vertical are matched to
each other and an agent with no mate on its vertical stays single.
4
(2) otherwise, f1(P)(y) = y.
Then, f1 assigns to P′ the following matching a1:
f1(P′) = a1 :
{
m1 m2 _
_ w2 w1
}
.
It is easy to see that f1 respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not efficient.
Meanwhile, let f2 be a matching rule that assigns to each profile P ∈ P a matching that
matches m1 to b(P(m1)) and m2 to his most preferred agent in (W ∪ {m2}) \ {b(P(m1))}. Then, f2
assigns to P′ the following matching a2:
f2(P′) = a2 :
{
m1 m2
w2 w1
}
.
It is easy to see that f2 is efficient, yet it does not respect pairwise unanimity.
Remark. Both individual rationality and respect for pairwise unanimity are necessary con-
ditions for stability. However, as Example 3 illustrates, individual rationality and respect for
pairwise unanimity are mathematically independent on P.
Example 3. Let n = l = 2. Consider a preference profile P′ ∈ P defined below:
P′ :
{
P′(m1) = w2m1w1 P′(w1) = m2m1w1
P′(m2) = w2w1m2 P′(w2) = m2m1w2
}
.
Let f1 be a matching rule that assigns the same matching as the M-optimal matching rule except
for P′ and assigns to P′ the following matching a1:
f1(P′) = a1 :
{
m1 m2
w1 w2
}
.
It is easy to see that f1 respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not individually rational.
Meanwhile, let f2 be a matching rule that assigns the same matching as the M-optimal
matching rule except for P′ and assigns to P′ the following matching a2:
f2(P′) = a2 :
{
m1 m2
w2 w1
}
.
It is easy to see that f2 is individually rational, yet it does not respect pairwise unanimity.
2.2. Results in one-to-one matchings
Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules must
be manipulable. Thus we pursue the possibility of strategy-proof rules by relaxing efficiency to
the weaker condition of respect for unanimity.
We call the following rule f , the minimum unanimous rule: First we divide P into the three
subsets P1, P2 and P3 defined below:
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P1 : The set of preference profiles P such that for all x ∈ M ∪W, b(P(b(P(x)))) = x.
P2 : The set of preference profiles P such that there exists (mi,w j) ∈ M ×W such that
(i) b(P(b(P(x)))) = x for all x ∈ M ∪W \ {mi,w j},
(ii) w jP(mi)mi and miP(w j)w j, and
(iii) b(P(mi)) , w j or b(P(w j)) , mi.
P3 : = P \ (P1 ∪ P2).
Then the minimum unanimous rule f assigns a matching to each profile P ∈ P by following
Directions 1, 2, and 3:
Direction 1 : For all preference profiles P ∈ P1 and all x ∈ M ∪W, f (P)(x) = b(P(x)).
Direction 2 : For all preference profiles P ∈ P2 and all x ∈ (M ∪ W) \ {mi,w j}, f (P)(x) = x,
f (P)(mi) = w j and f (P)(w j) = mi.
Direction 3 : For all preference profiles P ∈ P3 and all x ∈ M ∪W, f (P)(x) = x.
Our first result shows that the minimum unanimous rule f is strategy-proof and individually
rational, and respects unanimity.
Proposition 1. The minimum unanimous rule is strategy-proof and individually rational, and
respects unanimity.
Proof. By Direction 1, f respects unanimity on P. By Directions 1, 2 and 3, f is individually
rational on P. It suffices to show that f is strategy-proof on P.
First, consider a profile P ∈ P1. Since everyone is matched to her or his best by Direction
1, anyone cannot manipulate at such a profile.
Second, consider a profile P ∈ P2. If mi′ ∈ M \ {mi} tries to manipulate at P, he would
be single by Directions 2 and 3, and cannot be better off. Meanwhile, if the man mi tries to
manipulate at P, he would be matched to w j or be single by Directions 1, 2 and 3, and cannot
be better off. Similarly, any woman cannot manipulate at P.
Third, consider a profile P ∈ P3. Note that everyone stays single by Direction 3. Pick mi
from M arbitrarily.
Assume that there exists w j ∈ W such that (i′) b(P(b(P(x)))) = x for all x ∈ (M∪W)\{mi,w j},
and (ii′) miP(mi)w j and miP(w j)w j. Then, if the man mi tries to manipulate at P via any P′(mi) ∈
P(mi) such that miP′(mi)w j, P/P′(mi) is still in P3, and he would stay single by Direction 3.
On the other hand, if the man mi tries to manipulate at P via any P′′(mi) ∈ P(mi) such that
w jP′′(mi)mi, then P/P′′(mi) is in P1 or P2, and he would be matched with the woman w j to
whom he prefers staying single by Directions 1 and 2.
Next assume that there does not exist w j ∈ W for whom (i′) and (ii′) hold. Then, even if
the man mi manipulates via any P′(mi) ∈ P(mi) at P, P/P′(mi) is still in P3, and he would stay
single.
Therefore, the man mi cannot manipulate at any profiles in P3. Since mi is picked up arbi-
trarily from M, any man cannot manipulate at any profile in P3. Similarly, any woman cannot
manipulate at any profile in P3. 
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Proposition 1 appears a positive result. However, it has one negative aspect in that the min-
imum unanimous rule is unreasonable in the sense that it does not respect pairwise unanimity
and leaves all agents single for most preference profiles. Therefore, we explore the possibil-
ity of better strategy-proof rules that are individual rational and respect pairwise unanimity on
P. However, we prove that there exists no strategy-proof matching rule that respects pairwise
unanimity on P as below.
Proposition 2. There exists no strategy-proof matching rule that respects pairwise unanimity
on P.
Proof. First we prove the statement for the case with n = l = 2 . Later we will explain how to
extend the proof to the cases where n ≥ 3 or l ≥ 3.
We assume that the rule f respects pairwise unanimity, and prove that it must be manipula-
ble. Note that for the case with n = l = 2, the set of all possible matchings A is the following:
A =
{
a1 :
{
m1 m2
w1 w2
}
, a2 :
{
m1 m2
w2 w1
}
, a3 :
{
m1 m2 _
_ w1 w2
}
, a4 :
{
m1 m2 _
_ w2 w1
}
,
a5 :
{
m1 m2 _
w1 _ w2
}
, a6 :
{
m1 m2 _
w2 _ w1
}
, a7 :
{
m1 m2 _ _
_ _ w1 w2
} }
.
(1) Let P1 ∈ P be such that
P1 :
{
P1(m1) = w1w2m1 P1(w1) = m2m1w1
P1(m2) = w2w1m2 P1(w2) = m1m2w2
}
.
The set of all matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity for P1 is equal to A.
(2) Let P2 = P1/P1′(w1) where P1′(w1) = m2w1m1. That is,
P2 :
{
P2(m1) = w1w2m1 P2(w1) = m2w1m1
P2(m2) = w2w1m2 P2(w2) = m1m2w2
}
.
The set of all matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity for P2 is equal to A.
(3) Let P2′(w1) = w1m2m1. Then, f (P2/P2′(w1))(w1) = w1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(4) Let P2′(m1) = w2w1m1. Then, f (P2/P2′(m1))(m1) = w2 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(5) Let P2′(m2) = w1w2m2. Then, f (P2/P2′(m2))(m2) = w1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(6) Let P6 = P1/P1′(m1) where P1′(m1) = w1m1w2. That is,
P6 :
{
P6(m1) = w1m1w2 P6(w1) = m2m1w1
P6(m2) = w2w1m2 P6(w2) = m1m2w2
}
.
The set of all matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity for P6 is equal to A.
(7) Let P6′(m1) = m1w1w2. Then, f (P6/P6′(m1))(m1) = m1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(8) Let P6′(w2) = m2m1w2. Then, f (P6/P6′(w2))(w2) = m2 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(9) Let P6′(w1) = m1m2w1. Then, f (P6/P6′(w1))(w1) = m1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
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(10) Let P1′′(m1) = w2w1m1. Then, f (P1/P1′′(m1))(m1) = w2 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(11) Let P1′(m2) = w1w2m2. Then, f (P1/P1′(m2))(m2) = w1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
Now we prove that f is manipulable using the above preferences and matchings.
Note that Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 below cover all the possible matchings of f for P1. We show
that f is manipulable for each case.
Case 1 : f (P1) = a1.
If f (P2) = a2 or a3, that is, if f (P2)(w1) = m2, w1 can manipulate at P1 via P1′(w1) by
m2P1(w1)m1. If f (P2) = a1 or a5, that is, if f (P2)(w1) = m1, w1 can manipulate at P2
via P2′(w1) by (3) and w1P2(w1)m1. If f (P2) = a4, m1 can manipulate at P2 via P2′(m1)
by (4) and w2P2(m1)m1. If f (P2) = a6 or a7, m2 can manipulate at P2 via P2′(m2) by
(5) and w1P2(m2)m2.
Case 2 : f (P1) = a2.
If f (P6) = a1 or a5, that is, if f (P6)(m1) = w1, m1 can manipulate at P1 via P1′(m1)
by w1P1(m1)w2. If f (P6) = a2 or a6, that is, if f (P6)(m1) = w2, m1 can manipulate at
P6 via P6′(m1) by (7) and m1P6(m1)w2. If f (P6) = a3 or a7, that is, if f (P6)(w2) = w2,
w2 can manipulate at P6 via P6
′(w2) by (8) and m2P6(w2)w2. If f (P6) = a4, w1 can
manipulate at P6 via P6′(w1) by (9) and m1P6(w1)w1.
Case 3 : f (P1) = a3, a4 or a7.
Because f (P1)(m1) = m1, m1 can manipulate at P1 via P1′′(m1) by (10) and w2P1(m1)m1.
Case 4 : f (P1) = a5 or a6.
Because f (P1)(m2) = m2, m2 can manipulate at P1 via P1′(m2) by (11) and w1P1(m2)m2.
Next we explain how to prove the statement for the cases where n ≥ 3 or l ≥ 3. Let
the preferences of agents y ∈ (M ∪ W) \ {m1,m2,w1,w2} be such that b(P(y)) = y for all
(M ∪W) \ {m1,m2,w1,w2}. Then, all agents y ∈ (M ∪W) \ {m1,m2,w1,w2} would stay single
in matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity. Therefore, the proof for these cases is
identical to the above proof. 
Remark. Since stability implies respect for pairwise unanimity, our result implies Roth (1982)
showing that all stable matching rules must be manipulable.5
3. Many-to-One Matchings
In Section 2, we considered the matching problems on the one-to-one matching model. How-
ever, in terms of economic phenomena, many-to-one matchings in two-sided markets are typi-
cal, where one side of the market consists of institutions and the other side of individuals: for
example, colleges and students, firms and workers, hospitals and interns. Accordingly, in this
5Alcalde and Barberá (1994) also extend Roth’s result by relaxing stability to efficiency and individual rational-
ity. However, note that our arguments considered several matchings that satisfy our conditions, but not efficiency
and individual rationality.
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section we extend the negative result in Section 2 to the many-to-one matching model, com-
monly known as the college admissions problem.
3.1. Many-to-one matching model
Let C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} be the set of colleges and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sl} be the set of students. We
assume that both C and S are finite and disjoint sets. We also assume that n ≥ 2 and l ≥ 2.
Each college Ci has a quota qCi, which indicates the maximum number of positions it may
fill. We assume that each qCi is a positive integer. Hence, a matching of this model assigns each
student to at most one college and each college to at most its quota of students.
Each student s j ∈ S has a preference relation P(s j) on M(s j) ≡ {C1, . . . ,Cn, s j}. Let P(s j)
denote the set of all possible preferences for s j ∈ S . Each college Ci ∈ C has a preference
relation P(Ci) on M(Ci) ≡ {G ⊆ S : |G| ≤ qCi}.
Definition. (Roth and Sotomayor 1990): A preference P(Ci) is responsive if
(1) for all G ⊆ S with |G| < qCi and all s j ∈ S \G,
(G ∪ {s j})P(Ci)G ⇔ {s j}P(Ci)∅, and
(2) for all G ⊆ S with |G| < qCi and all s j, sk ∈ S \G,
(G ∪ {s j})P(Ci)(G ∪ {sk})⇔ {s j}P(Ci){sk}.
We assume that preferences of all colleges are responsive. Let P(Ci) denote the set of all
possible responsive preferences for Ci ∈ C. We assume that preferences are strict. We denote
preference profiles by P. Let P = ∏ni=1P(Ci) ×∏lj=1P(s j) be the set of all possible preference
profiles.
Definition. A matching a is a function a : C ∪ S → 2C∪S such that:
(1) for all s j ∈ S , a(s j) ∈ C ∪ {s j},
(2) for all Ci ∈ C, a(Ci) ⊆ S and |a(Ci)| ≤ qCi , and
(3) for all (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S , a(s j) = Ci ⇔ s j ∈ a(Ci).
Let A be the set of all possible matchings.
Definition. The best b(P(Ci),G) is the most preferred subset of G. That is, b(P(Ci),G) is the
subset of G such that b(P(Ci),G)P(Ci)G′ for all G′ ⊆ G such that G′ ∈ M(Ci) \ {b(P(Ci),G)}.
Definition. A matching a is blocked by a student s j ∈ S at P ∈ P if s jP(s j)a(s j). A matching a
is blocked by a college Ci ∈ C at P ∈ P if a(Ci) , b(P(Ci), a(Ci)).
Note that since colleges’ preferences are responsive, a matching a is blocked by a college
Ci ∈ C at P ∈ P if there exists a student s j ∈ a(Ci) such that ∅P(Ci){s j}.
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Definition. A matching a is individually rational at P ∈ P if it is not blocked by any agent
y ∈ (C ∪ S ) at P ∈ P.
Definition. A matching a is blocked by a pair (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S at P ∈ P if CiP(s j)a(s j) and
a(Ci) , b(P(Ci), a(Ci)∪{s j}). A matching a is stable at P ∈ P if it is not blocked by any student
s j ∈ S , any college Ci ∈ C, or any pair (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S .
Remark. (Sönmez 1996): The set of stable matchings is a singleton for each profile P ∈ P on
the many-to-one matching model with qCi ≥ |S | for all Ci ∈ C. Here after, we call the matching
rule f assigning the associated stable matching to each preference profile, the stable rule. The
stable rule f can be described as below: for all P ∈ P and all s j ∈ S ,
(1) if there exists a college Ci ∈ C such that {s j}P(Ci)∅,CiP(s j)s j and CiP(s j)C′i for all C′i ∈
C \ {Ci} such that {s j}P(C′i)∅, then f (P)(s j) = Ci, and
(2) otherwise, f (P)(s j) = s j.
Definition. A matching a ∈ A is blocked by a coalition I ⊆ (C ∪ S ), if there exists another
matching a′ , a such that for all students s j ∈ I and all colleges Ci ∈ I,
(1) a′(s j) ∈ I and a′(s j)P(s j)a(s j), and
(2) [s j ∈ a′(Ci)⇒ s j ∈ (I ∪ a(Ci))] and [a′(Ci)P(Ci)a(Ci)].
Definition. A matching is group stable at P ∈ P if it is not blocked by any coalition I ⊆ (C∪S )
at P ∈ P.
Remark. (Lemma 5.5. in Roth and Sotomayor, 1990): A matching is group stable if and only
if it is stable on P.
Definition. A matching a is (Pareto) efficient at P ∈ P if there is no other matching a′ , a such
that for all y ∈ C ∪ S ,
a′(y) , a(y)⇒ a′(y)P(y)a(y).
Definition. A matching rule is a function f from P to A. A matching rule f is individually
rational if for all profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is individually rational at P ∈ P. A matching rule f is
stable if for all profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is stable at P ∈ P. A matching rule f is efficient if for all
profiles P ∈ P, f (P) is efficient at P ∈ P.
Definition. A matching rule f is manipulable by an agent y ∈ C ∪ S at P ∈ P via P′(y) ∈ P(y)
if f (P/P′(y))(y)P(y) f (P)(y). A matching rule f is strategy-proof on P if it is not manipulable at
any P ∈ P by any y ∈ C ∪ S via any P′(y) ∈ P(y).
For all y ∈ C ∪ S and all P(y) ∈ P(y), let b(P(y)) be the best element, that is, b(P(y))P(y)G
for all G ∈ M(y) \ {b(P(y))}.
Remark. Notice that b(P(Ci), S ) = b(P(Ci)) for all Ci ∈ C.
Definition. A matching rule f respects unanimity on P if for all P ∈ P such that
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(1) for all Ci ∈ C, [b(P(Ci)) = ∅] or [ for all s j ∈ b(P(Ci)), b(P(s j)) = Ci], and
(2) for all s j ∈ S , b(P(s j)) = s j or s j ∈ b(P(b(P(s j)))),
for all y ∈ C ∪ S , f (P)(y) = b(P(y)).
Remark. Efficiency implies respect for unanimity.
Definition. A matching rule f respects pairwise unanimity on P if for all P ∈ P,
(1) for all Ci ∈ C such that b(P(Ci)) , ∅ and all s j ∈ S such that b(P(s j)) = Ci and s j ∈ b(P(Ci)),
f (P)(s j) = Ci,
(2) for all s j ∈ S such that b(P(s j)) = s j, f (P)(s j) = s j, and
(3) for all Ci ∈ C such that b(P(Ci)) = ∅, f (P)(Ci) = ∅.
Remark. Respect for pairwise unanimity implies respect for unanimity.
Remark. Stability implies respect for pairwise unanimity.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a matching rule f that is stable, yet it does not respect pairwise
unanimity on P. Then,
(1) there exists some profile P ∈ P and a pair (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S such that b(P(s j)) = Ci and
s j ∈ b(P(Ci)), and f (P)(s j) , Ci,
(2) there exists some profile P ∈ P and a student s j ∈ S such that b(P(s j)) = s j, and f (P)(s j) ,
s j, or
(3) there exists some profile P ∈ P and a college Ci ∈ C such that b(P(Ci)) = ∅, and f (P)(Ci) ,
∅.
Suppose that f satisfies (1). Since f satisfies (1) and P(Ci) is responsive, f (P)(Ci) ,
b(P(Ci), f (P)(Ci)∪ {s j}) and Ci P(s j) f (P)(s j). Then, f (P) is blocked by the pair (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S
at the profile P ∈ P. Next, suppose that f satisfies (2). Then, f (P) is blocked by the student s j
at the profile P ∈ P. Similarly, suppose that f satisfies (3). Then, f (P) is blocked by the college
Ci at the profile P ∈ P. This is contradicting stability of the matching rule f . 
Remark. As Example 4 illustrates, respect for pairwise unanimity does not imply stability.
Example 4. Let n = l = 2 and qC1 = qC2 = 2. Consider a preference profile P′ ∈ P defined
below:
P′ :
{
P′(C1) = {s1, s2} {s1} {s2} ∅ P′(s1) = C2 C1 s1
P′(C2) = {s2} ∅ {s1, s2} {s1} P′(s2) = C2 C1 s2
}
.
Let f be a matching rule that assigns a matching to each profile P ∈ P\{P′} subject to the stable
rule, and assigns to P′ the following matching a:6
f (P′) = a :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s2}
}
.
6We use the notation used by Sönmez (1996): a pair (Ci, S ′) ∈ C × 2S on the same vertical are matched to each
other and each student who is matched to herself or himself is omitted for ease of notation .
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It is easy to see that f respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not stable.
Remark. Both efficiency and respect for pairwise unanimity are necessary conditions for sta-
bility. However, as Example 5 illustrates, efficiency and respect for pairwise unanimity are
mathematically independent on P.
Example 5. Let n = l = 2 and qC1 = qC2 = 2. Consider the preference profile P′ ∈ P presented
in Example 4. Let f1 be such that, for all P ∈ P, for all Ci ∈ C, for all s j ∈ S ,
(1) if there exists a pair (Ci, s j) ∈ C × S such that b(P(s j)) = Ci and s j ∈ b(P(Ci)), then
f (P)(s j) = Ci, and
(2) otherwise, f1(P)(Ci) = ∅ or f1(P)(s j) = s j.
Then, f1 assigns to P′ the following matching a1:
f1(P′) = a1 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s2}
}
.
It is easy to see that f1 respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not efficient.
Meanwhile, consider a preference profile P′′ ∈ P defined below:
P′′ :
{
P′′(C1) = {s1} ∅ {s1, s2} {s2} P′′(s1) = C1 C2 s1
P′′(C2) = {s1} ∅ {s1, s2} {s2} P′′(s2) = C1 C2 s2
}
.
Let f2 be a matching rule that assigns a matching to each profile P ∈ P \ {P′′} subject to the
stable rule and assigns to P′′ the following matching a2:
f2(P′′) = a2 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s1}
}
.
It is easy to see that f2 is efficient, yet it does not respect pairwise unanimity.
Remark. Both individual rationality and respect for pairwise unanimity are necessary con-
ditions for stability. However, as Example 6 illustrates, individual rationality and respect for
pairwise unanimity are mathematically independent on P.
Example 6. Let n = l = 2 and qC1 = qC2 = 2. Consider a preference profile P′ ∈ P defined
below:
P′ :
{
P′(C1) = {s2} ∅ {s1, s2} {s1} P′(s1) = C1 C2 s1
P′(C2) = {s1, s2} {s1} {s2} ∅ P′(s2) = C2 C1 s2
}
.
Let f1 be a matching rule that assigns a matching to each profile P ∈ P \ {P′} subject to the
stable rule and assigns to P′ the following matching a1:
f1(P′) = a1 :
{
C1 C2
{s1} {s2}
}
.
It is easy to see that f1 respects pairwise unanimity, yet it is not individually rational.
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Meanwhile, let f2 be a matching rule that assigns a matching to each profile P ∈ P \ {P′}
subject to the stable rule and assigns to P′ the following matching a2:
f2(P′) = a2 :
{
C1 C2
{s2} {s1}
}
.
It is easy to see that f2 is individually rational, yet it does not respect pairwise unanimity.
3.2. Results in many-to-one matchings
We show that in the context of one-to-one matching problems, there is no strategy-proof
rule that respects pairwise unanimity. However, there is a significant change in this result when
colleges can admit as many students as they wish. Since respect for pairwise unanimity is a
necessary condition for stability, the stable rule respects pairwise unanimity. On the other hand,
strategy-proofness of the stable rule follows from Sönmez’s (1996) finding that the stable rule
is strategy-proof on the many-to-one matching model with qCi ≥ |S | for all Ci ∈ C. Therefore,
we obtain a positive result as below.
Proposition 3. If qCi ≥ |S | for all Ci ∈ C, then the stable rule is strategy-proof and respects
pairwise unanimity on P.
In the next proposition, we show that our negative result in the one-to-one matching model
extends to the many-to-one matching model where a college exists that cannot admit as many
students as it would like.
Proposition 4. If qCi < |S | for some Ci ∈ C, then there is no strategy-proof rule that respects
pairwise unanimity on P.
Proof. First, we prove the result for the case with n = l = 2. Later, we will explain how
to extend the proof to the cases where n ≥ 3 or l ≥ 3. Let qC1 = 1 < |S | = 2 without loss
of generality. Assume that the rule f respects pairwise unanimity, and prove that it must be
manipulable. Since the case with qC2 = 1 is covered by Proposition 2, it suffices to prove it for
cases with qC2 ≥ 2.
(1) Let P1 ∈ P be such that
P1 :
{
P1(C1) = {s2} {s1} ∅ P1(s1) = C1 C2 s1
P1(C2) = {s1, s2} {s1} {s2} ∅ P1(s2) = C2 C1 s2
}
.
The set of all matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity for P1 is the following:
a11 :
{
C1 C2
{s1} {s2}
}
, a12 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s2}
}
& a13 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s1, s2}
}
.
(2) Let P2 = P1/P1′(C2) where P1′(C2) = {s1}∅{s1, s2}{s2}. That is,
P2 :
{
P2(C1) = {s2} {s1} ∅ P2(s1) = C1 C2 s1
P2(C2) = {s1} ∅ {s1, s2} {s2} P2(s2) = C2 C1 s2
}
.
13
The set of all matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity for P2 is the following:
a21 :
{
C1 C2
{s1} {s2}
}
, a22 :
{
C1 C2
{s2} {s1}
}
, a23 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s1}
}
, a24 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s2}
}
,
a25 :
{
C1 C2
{s1} ∅
}
, a26 :
{
C1 C2
{s2} ∅
}
, a27 :
{
C1 C2
∅ ∅
}
& a28 :
{
C1 C2
∅ {s1, s2}
}
.
(3) Let P2′(C2) = ∅{s1}{s2}{s1, s2}. Then, f (P2/P2′(C2))(C2) = ∅ by respect for pairwise una-
nimity.
(4) Let P2′(s2) = C1 C2 s2. Then, f (P2/P2′(s2))(s2) = C1 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(5) Let P2′(s1) = C2 C1 s1. Then, f (P2/P2′(s1))(s1) = C2 by respect for pairwise unanimity.
(6) Let P1′(C1) = {s1}{s2}∅. Then, f (P1/P1′(C1))(C1) = {s1} by respect for pairwise unanimity.
Now we prove that f is manipulable using the above preferences and matchings. Note that
Cases 1 and 2 below cover all the possible matchings of f for P1. We show that f is manipulable
for each case.
Case 1 : f (P1) = a11.
If f (P2) = a22, a23 or a28, C2 can manipulate at P1 via P1
′(C2) by (2) and {s1}P1(C2){s2}
and {s1, s2}P1(C2){s2}. If f (P2) = a21 or a24, that is, if f (P2)(C2) = {s2}, C2 can
manipulate at P2 via P2′(C2) by (3) and ∅P2(C2){s2}. If f (P2) = a25 or a27, that is,
if f (P2)(s2) = s2, s2 can manipulate at P2 via P2′(s2) by (4) and C1P2(s2)s2. If
f (P2) = a26, s1 can manipulate at P2 via P2
′(s1) by (5) and C2P2(s1)s1.
Case 2 : f (P1) = a12 or a13.
Because f (P1)(C1) = ∅, C1 can manipulate at P1 via P1′(C1) by (6) and {s1}P1(C1)∅.
Next we explain how to prove the result for the cases where n ≥ 3 or l ≥ 3. Just like
the above proof, let qC1 < |S | without loss of generality. Let S 1 ⊆ S \ {s1, s2} be such that
|S 1| = qC1 − 1. Let the preferences of all students s j ∈ S 1 be such that b(P(s j)) = C1, those of
colleges Ci ∈ C \ {C1,C2} be such that b(P(Ci)) = ∅ and those of students s j ∈ S \ ({s1, s2} ∪ S 1)
be such that b(P(s j)) = s j. Let the preferences P1(C1) and P1′(C1) of C1 ∈ C be such that
P1(C1) = (S 1 ∪ {s2}) (S 1 ∪ {s1}) G ∅ for all G ∈ M(C1) \ {(S 1 ∪ {s1}), (S 1 ∪ {s2}), ∅}, and
P1′(C1) = (S 1 ∪ {s1}) (S 1 ∪ {s2}) G ∅ for all G ∈ M(C1) \ {(S 1 ∪ {s1}), (S 1 ∪ {s2}), ∅}.
Then, in matchings satisfying respect for pairwise unanimity, each student s j ∈ S 1 would
be matched to C1 ∈ C, each college Ci ∈ C \ {C1,C2} would be matched to ∅ and each student
s j ∈ S \ ({s1, s2} ∪ S 1) would be matched to the student s j. Therefore, the proof for these cases
is identical to the above proof. 
By Propositions 3 and 4, we have the following characterization of the class of matching
problems that admit strategy-proof rules that respect pairwise unanimity.
Theorem. Consider the matching problems with responsive preferences. There exists a strategy-
proof rule that respects pairwise unanimity if and only if each college’s quota is unlimited.
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4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing satisfactory matching rules. First, in
the one-to-one matching model, we establish that i) there exists a strategy-proof rule that is
individually rational and respects unanimity, and ii) there exists no strategy-proof rule that
respects pairwise unanimity. Second, we extended the result ii) to the many-to-one matching
model. Our results, together with Roth (1982) and Alcalde and Barberá (1994), suggest the
difficulty of designing strategy-proof rules satisfying better than respect for unanimity.
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